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Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations:
A Response to Criticisms
Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl
In two recent articles, we urged financial regulators to use cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) to evaluate financial regulations.1 John Coates has emerged as a
leading critic of this view.2 In this essay, we respond to his objections.
We make several points. First, Coates conflates two separate issues: the advisability of CBA and the uncertainty of CBA valuations. He argues that because scholars have so far disagreed about relevant valuations, regulators
should not engage in CBA.3 However, he exaggerates the difficulty of determining valuations. The current level of uncertainty justifies greater investment
in academic research, not the abandonment of CBA.
Second, Coates makes a series of theoretical arguments to the effect that
valuation difficulties do not arise merely from the paucity of academic research,
but also from the nature of financial markets. He argues that financial markets
are “central,” “social,” and “non-stationary” in a way that other markets are
not, and that this explains why valuation problems in financial markets cannot
be surmounted.4 In a recent paper, Jeffrey Gordon similarly argues that CBA of
financial regulations cannot work because financial markets are “constructed”

1.

Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 393 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2188990 [http://
perma.cc/TUN5-KBNQ]; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial
Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2014). For another recent defense, see Paul Rose & Christopher Walker, The Importance of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation, CENTER FOR
CAP. MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS (2013), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp
-content/uploads/2010/04/CBA-Report-3.10.13.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5P9-89ZA].
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John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications,
124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015).
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Id. at 998.
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Id. at 998-1002.
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or artificial.5 We argue the opposite: that because financial markets generate a
vast amount of data, and because most of the relevant valuations are monetary
in nature, financial regulations are ideal for CBA—much more suitable than
regulations of the environment and health and safety.
Third, Coates fails to provide plausible alternatives to CBA. At times, he
advocates “expert judgment,”6 which is an empty if not circular standard for
evaluating regulations and could easily be abused in ways that would reduce
the transparency of policy-making. In other places, he advocates “conceptual
CBA,”7 which we believe is also inferior to conventional (quantitative) CBA.
Gordon advocates “pragmatism.”8 These are not self-defining terms, nor is it
clear why anyone would consider them attractive. We survey these and other
alternatives to CBA, and we argue that none of them is a normatively defensible alternative to CBA.
Finally, Coates claims that if regulators were required to use CBA, judicial
review would “camouflage” discretionary choices by regulators rather than discipline them.9 We are more sympathetic to this argument than to Coates’s other arguments. However, our view is that the problem with judicial review is
not that it leads to camouflage; it is that judges are not likely to be sophisticated consumers of CBA. We therefore argue for further development of institutional support for CBA in the executive branch—support that should draw on
the expertise of private consultancies. Judicial review can be limited to ensuring
that regulators take advantage of that institutional support for CBA in the executive branch once it is in place.
i. is r ig o r o u s c b a o f f in a n c ia l r e g u l a t io n s im p o s s ib le ?
A. Uncertainty of Financial Valuations
To perform a CBA of a proposed financial regulation, regulators must be
able to draw on financial data in order to determine the relevant valuations. If
the data do not exist, or are noisy, or if no plausible identification strategy has
been developed, then regulators will not be able to determine valuations with
any confidence. This creates a dilemma. Regulators must either disregard CBA

5.

Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351 (2014).

6.

Coates, supra note 2, at 903-05.

7.

Id. at 996.

8.

Gordon, supra note 5, at 17.

9.

Coates, supra note 2, at 898-900.
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and rely on guesswork because of insufficient data or be unable to regulate
even when it is widely understood that regulation is socially desirable.
Consider bank capital requirements. Banks must maintain a specified minimum ratio of equity to assets. Should this ratio be four percent? Five percent?
Higher? Should different types of equity and different types of assets be treated
differently for purposes of calculating the ratio? Should the ratio depend on the
type of bank—whether it is large or small, national or regional, too big to fail
or not too big to fail?
To answer these questions, a regulator must first determine the cost burden of various ratios (and also of different risk-weighting systems, but we will
ignore this complication to keep the exposition clear). As the capital requirement increases, banks must raise interest rates, which will result in less lending
and lower profits. Calculating these costs is a straightforward exercise. Since
interest rates constantly rise and fall, and banks thus constantly adjust lending
practices, ample data are available to calculate the effect of capital requirements
on profits.10
The benefits side of the analysis is more challenging. The major variables
are (1) the reduction in the probability of a financial crisis resulting from an incremental increase in the capital ratio; and (2) the economic cost of a financial
crisis. The economic cost of a financial crisis in turn depends on how well the
government responds to the financial crisis, so one must calculate the cost of a
financial crisis conditional on a weak government response, the cost of a financial crisis conditional on a strong government response, and the probability
distribution of strong and weak responses.
Are the data available? Many countries have experienced financial crises in
recent history, so researchers have been able to estimate the relationship between those countries’ regulatory regimes (including capital requirements), the
frequency of their financial crises, and the severity of the resulting economic
downturns.11 The question about whether this research can be used to generate
reliable valuations boils down to whether there are enough data that exhibit
sufficient regularities.

10.

Coates lists a set of generic problems with predicting the effect of regulations on profits. Id.
at 963-64. However, these exist for non-financial regulation as well. If taken seriously, it
would be hard to imagine how any firms could function. Moreover, he confuses the problem
of calculating the costs to banks (which is simple) and social costs (which means performing
the entire cost-benefit analysis).

11.

For reports surveying the literature, see An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of
Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION
(2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf [http://perma.cc/64BE-6TZB]; and Macroecon. Assessment Grp., Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital
and Liquidity Requirements, FIN. STABILITY BOARD & BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, (2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/othp10.pdf [http://perma.cc/WGJ6-LLWH].
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Coates believes that the data are too sparse and noisy.12 To prove this point,
he shows that different studies make different estimates of the relevant variables across large ranges.13 We are less impressed by this variation than he is.
Our starting point is that a regulator must make these estimates, at least implicitly. If the Fed chooses a five percent capital requirement, then all the valuations can be backed out of this rule. As we have seen, the costs to banks can be
estimated; once those costs are estimated, the five percent number will imply a
minimum expected benefit in the form of avoided financial crises. We can then
ask whether the Fed’s implicit expected benefit in this hypothetical example is
consistent with the studies that Coates mentions. Given the range of studies,
no doubt the Fed can find one that supports it. But then the question is whether that study is reliable. As long as the public and economists know which
studies are currently driving a policy, they can criticize the policy if the studies
behind it are flawed and support it if the studies are not. Otherwise one is left
guessing which parameters are being drawn from where, greatly inhibiting the
progress of academic research on policy-relevant topics and thus the quality of
policy-making.14
Furthermore, Coates takes a far too static view of academic research. The
fact that existing studies generate a range of valuations does not mean that all
valuations are equally good or that the state of knowledge will never improve.
Researchers can criticize studies because they make unreasonable assumptions,
are sensitive to controversial assumptions, use bad data, employ the wrong
methodologies, and so on. Problems that are identified in existing studies
stimulate more research. The sorts of choices that Coates condemns as arbitrary, like the definition of financial crisis for coding purposes,15 are ubiquitous
in social science and even natural science research. Often, these choices can be
addressed straightforwardly with additional research. When multiple studies
are conducted, it will often be reasonable to discard outliers as statistical artifacts.
In our hypothetical bank capital requirement example, we would require
the Fed to perform and disclose its cost-benefit analysis so that the numbers
upon which it implicitly relied could be scrutinized by academics.16 The Fed
should also sponsor additional research that evaluates its assumptions and

12.

Coates, supra note 2, at 961-62.

13.

Id. at 962.

14.

On the role of CBA in promoting transparency, see Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001).

15.

Coates, supra note 2, at 963.

16.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reports, supra note 11, provide an excellent
model. See Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital Adequacy Requirements?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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methods. Even if, in the end, a large range of valuations existed, and the Fed
had no choice but to choose a valuation from within the range, the exercise
would be valuable because it would show where additional research was necessary. CBA itself would not impose much discipline in those circumstances, but
the Fed would still need to justify in a qualitative sense why it chose a valuation
from one part of the range rather than another. Over time, as the Fed continued to adjust the capital ratio, this precedent would help constrain it. If the Fed
traditionally chose from the middle of the range, and then one day chose an
outlier, people would demand an explanation. The Fed should be required to
provide one.
The problem of uncertain valuations is a commonplace of regulation.17 Environmental regulations are famously plagued by the problem of valuing intangible assets, such as the existence value of dramatic views and the preservation of unique species of insects, for which no plausible valuation methodology
of any kind exists.18 It has been difficult for regulators to attach valuations to
the risk of death, the discomfort of illness, the loss of recreational opportunities, and the pleasure of inhaling clean rather than dirty air. While some mechanisms in finance may be complex, almost all financial benefits and costs can be
measured in terms of utility functions over money, the area of economics with
the longest history (dating at least back to the seventeenth century) and the area most firmly understood by economists. Moreover, measuring financial costs
and benefits does not make people as queasy as efforts to measure death, pain,
and lost relationships.
B. The Centrality of Finance
Coates argues that financial regulators should not use CBA because “finance is at the heart of the economy.”19 Yet this consideration actually cuts in
the opposite direction. CBA is a costly procedure for generating greater information to make policy-making in an area more precise. A plausible argument
against CBA is that a given area of regulation is so peripheral to the economy
that it is not worth making investments in improving policy-making in that area. Indeed, this view is reflected in the longstanding rule that only “major”
17.

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369 (2014). The
proceedings of a recent conference on this topic, Developing Regulatory Policy in the Context of
Deep Uncertainty: Legal, Economic, and Natural Science Perspectives, held by the University of
Chicago Law School (Apr. 26-27, 2013), are forthcoming in the Journal of Legal Studies.

18.

The Environmental Protection Agency uses contingent valuation surveys; most economists
are skeptical of them. See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation:
Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1994); Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2012).

19.

Coates, supra note 2, at 1002.
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regulations—those with an annual economic impact of at least $100 million—
require CBA. An area’s centrality to the economy is precisely what justifies
making such investments. Therefore, we view the centrality of finance as an
important factor favoring CBA of financial regulations.
It seems that Coates is worried about a slightly different problem: the
complexity of financial phenomena.20 But all regulations, and not just financial
regulations, have complex causal effects. Consider a regulation that requires
factories to install scrubbers. The regulation has certain, easily identifiable
“first-order” effects: the factory must pay money for scrubbers. The reduction
in pollution enhances human health. But the regulation also has more complicated “second-order” effects: companies that manufacture scrubbers will make
larger profits, while doctors will lose profits. The factory owner might pass on
costs to consumers, resulting in higher prices, or to workers, resulting in lower
wages. Consumers and workers then might purchase fewer goods, hurting still
others farther down the causal chain, and these others in turn will change their
behavior, and so on.
This is a generic problem for CBA,21 and so three points must be made.
First, like much of Coates’s argument, causal complexity is better interpreted as
a critique of CBA as such rather than as a critique of financial CBA. Second,
complexity is a problem for all forms of regulation, and in fact all forms of economic analysis, not just for CBA. Coarse assumptions and rules of thumb must
attend to second-order and third-order effects if they are significant, as suggested in recent work on general equilibrium effects in CBA of other areas of
regulation.22 Third, nth-order effects probably wash out. A pollution regulation
that increases costs for consumers might cause them to spend less, but the
same regulation might reduce medical costs for other people, who will spend
more. The further down one goes along the causal chain, the safer it is to ignore the effects of the regulation.
Coates’s argument can therefore be reinterpreted as a more complicated
claim that compared to other areas of regulation, financial regulation will (1)
have more nth-order effects; of (2) a greater magnitude; (3) that cannot be expected to wash out; and (4) that cannot be reliably identified and measured by
regulators. Coates does not provide a plausible justification for this conjecture,
and it seems to us very likely to be false. Consider antitrust regulation. The approval of a merger of two large firms could have an immense number of large

20.

Id.

21.

See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unemployment and Regulatory Policy, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? (Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel & Christopher Carrigan eds., 2014).

22.

Lawrence H. Goulder & Roberton C. Williams III, The Substantial Bias from Ignoring General
Equilibrium Effects in Estimating Excess Burden, and a Practical Solution, 111 J. POL. ECON. 898
(2003).
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effects far down the causal chain, which are nearly impossible to identify. Yet
mergers are routinely subjected to CBA.23 Why? The answer is that the academic literature has progressed to a point that researchers are confident that
regulators can safely ignore many effects that are either small or likely to wash
out, depending on the structure of markets, and so should focus their attention
on certain effects—like economies of scale, product substitution, and so on.24
Sometimes CBA analysts will mistakenly discount an effect that is in fact very
large; one of us has written extensively about important effects that are commonly ignored in antitrust CBA.25 However, because of the huge amount of information about prices and industrial behavior, regulators can use statistical
techniques that give them a reasonable amount of confidence about their predictions, and these techniques are continually improving the accuracy of policy
precisely because the existence of CBA provides incentives for such improvements.26 Similar types and volumes of information are available for financial
markets as well, and this suggests that financial markets can also be regulated
with CBA and that the techniques for doing so will improve over time.
C. The Role of People and Social Groups in Finance
Coates argues that financial regulators should not use CBA because “the
main units of variation and change in finance are not things, or even individuals, but groups of people—groups with not only economic but also social and
political relations.”27 When a financial regulator designs a bank regulation, it
must predict how the people who operate the bank will adjust the bank’s portfolio in response to the regulation. By contrast, an environmental regulator focuses on chemistry and physics; it must predict how a change in a manufacturing process, for example, will affect the chemistry of the air. While such a
prediction is not necessarily easy, it can be based on known physical laws and
information derived from experiments in the lab.
The distinction Coates draws between financial regulation and other types
of regulation, however, is overdrawn. Because financial markets usually involve
a massive number of sophisticated agents who have a very narrow objective (to

23.

See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMMISSION 1 (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7RUH-YRGN].

24.

Cf. id.

25.

Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, Price Theory and Merger Guidelines, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L
ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2011.

26.

E. Glen Weyl, Finance and the Common Good 14 (May 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271832 [http://perma.cc/9KGU-8HAS].

27.

Coates, supra note 2, at 1000.
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make money), their behavior can often be predicted. If a regulator increases
minimum capital requirements beyond banks’ current capital-asset ratios,
banks will almost certainly respond by selling assets and paying off debt. Their
profits will decline, and so will their stock prices. Banks are likely to raise interest rates, and borrowers are likely to look for credit from financial institutions
that are not subject to the rules.28 Compared to other areas of economics like
industrial organization, which is the foundation of antitrust CBAs, financial
economics has a far stronger track record of accurate prediction and precise
mathematical modeling.29
The “people” problem that Coates identifies is just the problem of regulating people, as opposed to inanimate objects; it is not a problem that is specific
to CBA or finance. It is common to all social sciences, which form the basis for
most policy. Moreover, even environmental regulators do not really regulate
inanimate objects; they regulate people (and “groups”) as well. When environmental regulators ban the use of chemical X as an input in a manufacturing
process, they must contend with the risk that producers will substitute worse
chemical Y or Z, or the risk that the higher prices will cause consumers to
switch to a worse form of behavior. Consider, for example, the ubiquitous worry that excessive regulation of airline safety raises prices, causing consumers to
substitute to automobile travel, which is much more dangerous. Even the
problem of estimating how governments will respond to future events is not
unique to financial regulation: that problem is central to regulation of climate
emissions, where the cost of mitigation—such as the construction of sea walls
by governments—plays a significant role in CBA. Regulators of all kinds cannot avoid regulating, and hence making predictions about the behavior of people. That’s what they are supposed to do.
The weakness of Coates’s argument becomes particularly clear when one
turns one’s attention to antitrust regulation. Antitrust regulation is just regulation of people or groups as they buy and sell from each other. In this respect, it
is exactly the same as financial regulation. Antitrust regulators do not deal with
inanimate objects, cannot rely on the laws of chemistry and physics, and cannot conduct experiments in the lab. Yet CBA-based antitrust regulation is now
entrenched.30

28.

See sources cited supra note 11.

29.

For a good popular treatment of this, see DONALD A. MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE NOT A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL MODELS SHAPE MARKETS (2006).

30.

See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 23.
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D. The “Non-Stationarity” of Finance
Coates argues that another problem with financial CBA is that, relative to
CBA of regulations of other areas of life, financial CBA must contend with the
fact that “the underlying regularities that enable quantification are commonly
‘non-stationary’ in finance—more likely to change over time in finance than in
other domains.”31 Coates again cites the law of physics—gravitational constants
remain constant by definition and do not change over time—and compares the
invariance of physical laws to the changeability of financial patterns, like the
dividend payout ratio.32
But Coates is comparing apples and oranges. Physical laws constrain financial transactions, which ultimately involve keystrokes, the movement of electronic impulses, and other physical manifestations, just as they constrain rocket
ships. A more accurate comparison would be, for example, changes in how
firms manufacture pesticides and changes in how they lend money to each other. Or consider changes in how people communicate with each other (by landline, by cell phone, over the web, using email or Facebook or Twitter, and so
on)—changes that have accelerated massively over the last decade. Or consider
the agricultural industry, which is constantly tinkering with the genetic composition of organisms. Or the pharmaceutical industry, which is continuously
modifying the chemical composition of drugs. Antitrust law must contend with
the constantly shifting organizational forms and contractual arrangements of
business firms. CBA of emissions controls must contend with one of the most
unstable and non-stationary systems known to humankind: the earth’s climate
system.33
The “underlying regularities” in these industries are just as “nonstationary” as those in finance. So rather than conclude that financial CBA is
impossible in the face of the Hereclitian flux, we can learn from regulators of
other industries how financial regulators should act in the face of rapid change
in the regulated activities. The major lesson that emerges is that regulators
31.

Coates, supra note 2, at 1001.

32.

Id. at 1001-02.

33.

The U.S. government performed a CBA in order to determine the “social cost of carbon.”
See The Social Cost of Carbon, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov
/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html [http://perma.cc/L4LZ-73SX]. One of us
has criticized this CBA, see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the
Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557 (2011), but there is no doubt that it was
an extremely sophisticated and valuable exercise, one that has stimulated important academic research, see, e.g., Elisabeth J. Moyer et al., Climate Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers
of Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law and
Econ., Working Paper No. 652, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2312770 [http://perma.cc
/K6AC-7SJB], and will lay groundwork for more precise estimates as the science catches up
to policy needs.
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should require agents to obtain regulatory approval before marketing a new device or process that might cause widespread harm. The effect of this approach
is to freeze the market temporarily. A pharmaceutical company can invent
whatever drugs it wants to, but it cannot market them until after it receives
FDA approval. This gives the FDA the time to engage in a thorough review.
We have advocated a similar approach to financial innovations.34
There are also other ways to deal with a rapidly changing environment. In
tax law, the IRS must address the same problem that financial regulators face:
sophisticated agents constantly invent new transactional structures that enable
them to minimize the tax burdens that they bear. Because the IRS could not
keep up, Congress finally passed laws that enabled courts to penalize tax evaders ex post by imposing significant sanctions under broad standards.35 These
standards are themselves based on cost-benefit (or, more precisely, costeffectiveness) principles: they ban transactions that generate no social value
beyond comparable taxable transactions because their entire structure is driven
by tax-minimization. Similarly, financial regulators could impose sanctions ex
post based on cost-benefit principles.
Another response to the problem of “non-stationarity” is to provide adequate staff and budgeting to regulatory agencies. This enables these agencies to
pay experts in the industry to alert them to developments, hire researchers to
analyze data, and monitor industry players. Bank inspections that currently
take place every six months or once a year could be increased; inspections could
be expanded to hedge funds and other financial agents that currently operate
under more limited regulatory oversight.
E. The Artificiality of Finance
Jeffrey Gordon, like Coates, argues that the financial economy is constructed from laws and regulations, unlike the “real economy” of goods and services.36 Like Coates, Gordon thinks that CBA may be appropriate for regulations that apply to physical processes rather than social groups.37 However,
Gordon makes the further point that because financial transactions are themselves endogenous to the regulatory framework, further adjustments of the

34.

See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable
Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307 (2013).

35.

See David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 88 (2002).

36.

Gordon, supra note 5, at 6.

37.

Id. at 5.
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regulatory framework based on cost-benefit principles would lead to bad or arbitrary outcomes.38
We find this argument puzzling. Let’s consider the thought experiment
that Gordon employs. Imagine a society in which people borrow and lend subject only to the rules of property and contract law. Gordon seems to think that
such a primitive financial system could be regulated using cost-benefit principles. Presumably this means that if the government fears that unregulated
credit might lead to financial crisis, then it could use cost-benefit analysis to
determine constraints—taxes or rules like minimum capital requirements—that
reflect the expected cost of a financial crisis.
Gordon’s major point is that modern financial markets reflect earlier regulatory choices. Money market mutual funds exist today only because banks
were forbidden to pay interest to depositors in the 1970s. Pressure emerged for
an alternative. Regulators allowed money market mutual funds to pay interest
as long as they invested in safe and liquid assets. As a consequence, there
emerged two types of depository institutions, albeit subject to different rules.
Later banks were allowed to charge interest rates. Still later, they were allowed
to combine with investment banks.39
Exactly why this complex pattern of regulation undermines cost-benefit
analysis eludes us, but we can make some conjectures. Suppose, for example,
regulators decide, in light of the financial crisis, that money market mutual
funds are too risky. They consider some regulations that would restrict the investments made by these funds. On the cost side, the mutual funds would lose
some money, which could be estimated. Calculating the benefits will be more
difficult. One problem is estimating the effect on the probability of a financial
crisis of a mutual fund industry that holds incrementally safer investments.
Another problem—and this is what we think Gordon has in mind—is that one
would also need to estimate the change in the flow of funds. Some investors
would withdraw cash from mutual funds and invest them in other financial institutions. Some investors would, at the margin, give up the benefits of liquidity in order to obtain a higher return. Others might put their money in banks,
where there are fewer restrictions on withdrawal. The regulator thus would
need to take into account the possibility that stricter regulation of mutual funds
would lead to more funds in other financial institutions—some of which are
riskier or more lightly regulated.
Can a regulator estimate these risks? There is no reason in principle to believe that such estimates are impossible. If they are hard, it is not because financial markets are artificial rather than real; it is because financial markets are
complicated. The problem that Gordon identifies is just another species of reg38.

Id. at 10–11.

39.

See Gordon, supra note 5.
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ulatory arbitrage, similar to the problem that if the government regulates airplanes too strictly, then consumers will substitute to more-dangerous automobiles, and if they regulate automobiles too strictly, then consumers will substitute to still more dangerous bicycles. This type of behavior creates complex
problems. Should the government respond by regulating cars less strictly or by
creating additional protections for bicyclists? Regulatory arbitrage is ubiquitous. The right response is not to abandon cost-benefit analysis, but to try to
anticipate arbitrage and counter it as it emerges and is identified.
ii. a lt e r n a t iv e s t o c o s t-b e n e f it a n a ly s is
Critics of cost-benefit analysis must explain what alternative decisionprocedure regulators should use. In environmental, health, and safety regulation, alternatives do exist, including risk-risk analysis, quality-adjusted life
years (QALY), and feasibility analysis. These alternatives make little sense on
their own terms, but they are particularly inappropriate for financial regulation. Risk-risk and QALY analysis direct the regulator to consider the risks of
death and morbidity—risks that are not affected by financial transactions. Feasibility analysis directs the regulator to choose the strictest regulation that does
not cause excessive unemployment.40 It is hard to imagine how such a decision-procedure could be used in financial regulation, and because no one has
suggested that it should be, we will not address how these other decisionprocedures might be used.
Coates argues that financial regulators should use their “expert judgment”;41 he also argues that they should use what he calls “conceptual CBA.”42
But neither of these proposals is plausible. First, the invocation of expert
judgment is circular. To see why, suppose the experts themselves asked researchers how they could improve regulatory decision-making. If researchers
replied by telling them to use their “expert judgment,” the experts would be no
more enlightened than before. More to the point, the invocation of “expert
judgment” is simply an expression of confidence in the status quo and an invitation to complacency. “Expert judgment” did not prevent the financial crisis
from taking place; why should we defer to it?
Furthermore, if experts are allowed to make judgments without having to
justify those judgments and make explicit their assumptions, it becomes more
difficult both for the public to understand and challenge the reasoning and for
future experts, attempting to learn from the past, to make the best decisions
40.

For a discussion of the literature, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 95 (2006).

41.

Coates, supra note 2, at 903-04.

42.

Id. at 1008.
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going forward. A large cognitive psychology literature has shown that experts,
like ordinary people, make predictable errors in reasoning—overreacting to
highly salient events, for example. By forcing experts to quantify and defend
their assumptions, CBA can help correct for these mistakes.43
We are also puzzled by Coates’s confidence in “conceptual CBA.”44 In a paper mostly devoted to attacking CBA, it is surprising to learn at the end that
regulators should use CBA after all. What is the difference between “conceptual
CBA” and ordinary CBA? We are not sure. One possibility is that “conceptual
CBA” is an accounting exercise rather than a decision-procedure. The regulator
identifies the possible effects (or possibly major effects) of a regulation but
does not attempt to monetize them when valuations cannot be determined. But
then the question is how exactly the regulator determines whether to regulate
or not, or how strictly to regulate. Coates does not tell us. It cannot simply be
the number of the factors on each side; some weight must be put on each. And
if this weighting is done, then that is CBA, albeit of a very coarse form.
Another possibility is that conceptual CBA is a species of what one of us has
called “intuitive balancing.”45 The regulator takes into account the possible effects of a regulation but does not monetize them; it instead simply guesses
whether the positive effects outweigh the negative effects. But do we want regulation based on guesswork? Coates denounces standard CBA for being “number-laden guesswork,”46 but then he ends up endorsing “guesswork” in the
form of conceptual CBA.
When CBA is based on uncertain calculations, conceptual CBA and ordinary CBA do not differ. Under ordinary CBA, when there is a large range of
valuations, the regulator is permitted to choose a valuation within this range,
assuming the regulator provides a reasonable justification. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) guidance documents for regulators that
currently use CBA provide a variety of methods for addressing uncertainty.47 It
is unclear how conceptual cost-benefit analysis improves on these methods. In
cases for which better data are available, conceptual CBA is clearly worse than
ordinary CBA, as it sacrifices precision by refusing to admit quantitative measurements of factors and instead relying on guesswork.
43.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000).

44.

Coates, supra note 2, at 1009-10.

45.

ADLER & POSNER, supra note 40, at 98-99.

46.

Coates, supra note 2, at 998.

47.

See, e.g., Circular A-4, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT §§ A, E(7)(b)
(Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars
/a004/a-4.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q7DX-9BHW]; Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer, OFF.
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT 12-13, http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer
.pdf [http://perma.cc/G52H-NCP7].

258

cost-benefit analysis of financial regulations

Coates also invokes the Taylor Rule,48 but we do not see the relevance of
this rule to his argument. The Taylor Rule was determined inductively. For a
number of years, the U.S. economy enjoyed low inflation and high growth.
During this period, the Fed raised and lowered interest rates in a manner that
turned out to be relatively consistent; the Taylor Rule describes the Fed’s actions as a function of certain economic fundamentals. Whether or not the Taylor Rule can be defended on the basis of an economic analysis, this type of inductive approach is plainly inadequate for financial regulation. Capital
adequacy rules also existed during this period of economic prosperity. Applying the Taylor logic that Coates touts, we might accordingly infer that regulators should use those rules. But plainly the capital adequacy rules that existed
during that period were not necessarily optimal. While historical data informs
an application of CBA, the data must be analyzed with care. Simply extending
regulations that are correlated with past economic prosperity is a bad idea.
Indeed, few, if any, serious central bankers believe in always adhering to
the Taylor Rule. Most serious macroeconomists believe it is, at best, a good anchor for thinking about policy decisions.49 Since the 2007 crash, this rule has
fallen into even greater disfavor for its exclusive focus on unemployment and
inflation, to the neglect of the sort of “n-order” factors that Coates elsewhere
claims are important, such as asset prices. In fact, Coates’s sympathy towards
such rules makes it hard to understand what he is advocating, other than not
using CBA.
Gordon suggests another approach to financial regulation, which he calls
pragmatism.50 The approach at first sounds similar to “conceptual CBA,” but
Gordon goes further by arguing that regulators can determine
subsidiary principles of pragmatic design, for example: minimize the
extent to which financial institution[s] can free-ride on systemic stability costs paid by others; . . . provide regulators with sufficient information to observe the consequences of their rules; establish regulatory
panopticons with authority only to observe the financial system as it
evolves and the non-exclusive responsibility of sounding the alarms;
grant regulators the power to make regulatory modifications.51
One can dismiss several of these principles. Regulators already possess the
power to make regulatory modifications; the question is how they should de48.
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termine whether to do so. While it makes sense to give regulators information
and establish watchdogs, these proposals have nothing to do with the question
of whether CBA or some other decision-procedure is superior.
Let us focus on the first principle: minimizing the extent to which financial
institutions can free-ride on systemic stability costs paid by others. We agree
that regulators should stop financial institutions from free-riding on systemic
stability costs. But this just gets us back to where we started. Only regulations
can block financial institutions from free-riding, and the question is what form
those regulations should take. If they are too weak, then the goal will not be
accomplished. But if they are too strong, then financial institutions, while
blocked from free-riding, will also be unable to supply credit except at a cost
that, in aggregate, harms society. Gordon provides no guidance for making this
tradeoff.
iii. ju d ic ia l r e v ie w
Coates believes that judicial review of financial CBAs—whether they are
“conceptual” or ordinary CBAs—would be unwise.52 He argues that political
constraints are sufficient to block regulations that are clearly not costjustified.53 Moreover, CBA will not otherwise constrain regulators because they
can select from a wide range of valuations; indeed, regulators will use CBA to
camouflage their discretionary choices.54 CBA itself may not satisfy a costbenefit test, and experience already shows that judicial review of CBA does not
generate useful information.55 Finally, the materials used to generate a CBA,
including any inter-agency discussions, will create a large record that will be
used against the regulator in litigation, and in response regulators will go to
Congress in order to obtain statutory mandates so that they are not blocked by
CBAs.56 The upshot is that CBA will not provide information to the public;
will slow down regulation, deregulation, and regulatory reform; will increase
polarization; and will damage public confidence in the courts.57
Chicken Little could hardly paint a bleaker picture. But it can’t be the case
that CBA is so flexible that it allows regulators to do what they want while
camouflaging their choices, and yet so rigid that it enables courts to strike
down regulations for failing CBA. Nor is the limited experience with financial
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regulation sufficient to draw firm conclusions about the viability of judicial review. Much the same could have been said back in the early 1980s when formal
CBA of environmental, health, and safety regulations began. Moreover,
Coates’s confidence in the status quo, just a few years after a massive financial
crisis that the regulators failed to anticipate, and in the wake of a muchcriticized reorganization of financial regulators, seems unwarranted. Indeed,
the lesson of many of his case studies is how poorly the regulators performed
before the financial crisis. Banks “were . . . grossly undercapitalized” in 2008,
Coates says,58 yet he fails to draw the obvious conclusion: that they were grossly undercapitalized because of the mistakes of regulators.59 Rather than accept
the obvious implication—that there is something wrong with how the regulators operate—Coates argues that banks should be left alone.
The question of whether courts should enforce CBA of financial regulations
boils down to the usual tradeoff between decision costs and error costs, and to
considerations of relative institutional competence. If courts do not enforce
CBA of financial regulations, then financial regulators may continue to issue
regulations that fail cost-benefit tests. These regulations may be excessively
strict or excessively lax, depending on the configuration of ideology, interest
group influence, and technical sophistication that happens to influence a regulator at any given time. Because most financial regulators are independent
agencies, even a well-motivated President may find it impossible to compel
them to take CBA seriously. However, if courts do enforce CBA, there is the
risk that they will do a poor job, with the result that good regulations will be
struck down. Judges themselves may be ideologically motivated and unwilling
to enforce CBA properly for that reason; alternatively, they may not be able to
understand how CBA works. At a theoretical level, the tradeoff is indeterminate.60
That said, we agree with Coates, albeit with less confidence, that judicial
review is premature at the current time. Given how little experience financial
regulators have with CBA, a statutory requirement that they use CBA probably
would bring financial regulation to a halt, and we do not think this would be
socially desirable. Instead, we would urge the executive branch to exercise
some leadership and begin a process of training financial regulators, setting
standards, and providing for an interagency review process modeled on OIRA.
As it did in 1981, the executive branch should assert greater control over the fi-
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nancial regulators by issuing an executive order requiring them to perform
CBAs for major rules. Regulators would be required to submit these rules to
OIRA, which would return the proposed rules to the regulators if the CBA is
not good enough. Regulators would also be encouraged to develop expertise in
CBA, rely on peer-review, and fund research on valuations.
We also believe that regulators should not bear the full burden of CBA:
some burden should be borne by objecting regulated parties, who should have
to quantify their objections to regulations. Our proposal for pre-approval regulation for new financial derivatives, for example, would put much of the burden of making the case for a new product on the proposing party.61
c o n c lu s io n
While there is much of value in Coates’s article, we would interpret it as an
effort to guide future research toward improvement of valuations for financial
CBAs, not as a critique of CBA of financial regulation. Coates’s theoretical arguments to the effect that financial regulation is distinctive, and hence not susceptible to CBA unlike other types of regulation, are weak, and in fact much of
the evidence he cites suggests the opposite of what he claims. CBA is at least as
well suited to financial regulation as to other forms of regulation, and possibly
better suited. There are two reasons for this. First, economists understand financial markets at least as well as scientists understand the environment or the
human body (consider again the problems of climate change). Second, the valuations relevant to financial CBAs are almost all monetary, and therefore easier
to estimate than the valuations that are relevant to environmental, health, and
safety regulation, which frequently involve measuring the impact of nonmarket goods on human well-being.
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